Systems Engineering has been defined (EIA/IS-632) as "an interdisciplinary approach encompassing the entire technical effort to evolve and verify an integrated and life-cycle balanced set of system people, product, and process solutions that satisfy customer needs". Designing reliable space-based systems has always been a goal for NASA, and many painful lessons have been learned along the way. One of the continuing functions of a system engineer is to compile development and operations "lessons learned" documents and ensure their integration into future systems development activities. They can produce insights and information for risk identification on a new project. Lessons learned files from previous projects are especially valuable in risk identification and characterization.
Within the life cycle process, a number of essential functional Systems Engineering processes are necessary to provide customer satisfaction. One of the key processes is training. Fundamental to any training is the exploitation of lessons learned files, thus enabling the achievement and maintenance of skills and abilities necessary to perform the necessary processes throughout the life cycle for a flight vehicle development.
As part of the NASA Technical Standards Program activities, engineering lessons learned datasets have been identified from a number of sources. These are being searched and screened for those having a relation to Technical Standards. This paper will address some of the Systems Engineering Lessons Learned with respect to how they are being related to Technical Standards within the NASA Technical Standards Program. They are also being linked to the Agency's Interactive Engineering Discipline Training Courses with respect to the life cycle for a flight vehicle development
BACKGROUND
The NASA Technical Standards Program http://standards.nasa.gov undertook an initiative to identify lessons learned that might be linked to technical standards and thus influence the updating of the standard. For example, the lessons learned regarding the Apollo fire in the 1960's resulted in the change of NASA Standard 6001 regarding standards to test flammability with vertical versus horizontal samples. One of the actions of the initiative was to identify candidate Systems Engineering related lessons learned that might be linked to technical standards. Based on the information in the NASA Lessons Learned Information System (LLIS), Orbital Space Plane Lessons Learned (OSPLL), and other databases, plus the experiences of various people, a number of Systems Engineering lessons learned were identified. Several have been noted below and additional lessons learned summarized in the subsequent section of the paper. They are listed in no particular order of priority or relative significance. The sample is to illustrate the type of Systems Engineering lessons learned encountered during the past forty years and their relative importance.
A. Design Analysis Applied To Launch Vehicle Configurations-LLIS 0762
Background: This lesson is based on Reliability Practice No. PD-ED-1230 from NASA Technical Memorandum 4322A, NASA Reliability Preferred Practices for Design and Test. It addresses the use of advanced design management methods in each program phase of major launch vehicle developments to maximize reliability and minimize cost overruns. Significant improvements in user satisfaction, error-free performance, and operational effectiveness can be achieved through the use of these methods.
Lesson:
Failure to effectively use the methods and tools described in this Reliability Practice process could result in excessive project development time or cost, and failure to attain the highest achievable reliability. Design management improvements such as matrix methods, quality techniques, and life cycle cost analyses should be used in a systematic approach to systems analyses
B. Mars Climate Orbiter Mishap Investigation Board-Phase I Report-LLIS 0641
Background: The Mars Climate Orbiter (MCO) Mission objective was to orbit Mars as the first interplanetary weather satellite and provide a communications relay for the Mars Polar Lander (MPL), which was due to reach Mars in December 1999. The MCO was launched on December 11, 1998, and was lost sometime following the spacecraft's entry into Mars occultation during the Mars Orbit Insertion (MOI) maneuver. The spacecraft's carrier signal was last seen at approximately 09:04:52 UTC on Thursday, September 23, 1999. The MCO Mishap Investigation Board (MIB) determined that the root cause for the loss of the MCO spacecraft was the failure to use metric units in the coding of a ground software file, "Small Forces," used in trajectory models.
Lesson:
Among the contributing causes to this failure was "System Engineering process did not adequately address transition from development to operations". Recommendations included "Develop an execute Systems verification matrix for all requirements" and "Establish MPL Systems organization to concentrate on trajectory correction maneuver number 5 and entry, descent and landing operations..
C. Comet Nucleus Tour (CONTOUR) Mishap Investigation-LLIS 1385
Background: The Comet Nucleus Tour (CONTOUR) was designed and built as part of NASA's Discovery series of solar system exploration satellites. Launched on July 3, 2002, it was intended to encounter at least two comets to perform a variety of analyses on comet material. However, sometime after the solid rocket motor (SRM) intended to move the satellite out of eccentric earth orbit was fired, the satellite was lost. Mission design did not allow for observation or telemetry coverage during SRM burn, so the mishap investigation board was unable to determine with certainty the cause of the failure. However, a major finding of the investigation was that telemetry rd AIAA Aerospace Sciences Meeting, January 8- 13, 2005 or visual coverage o the satellite during SRM burn was, in fact, possible and may help prevent similar mishaps in the future..
Lesson:
Two of the lessons learned included "Inadequate Systems Engineering process and specification of requirements" and "Inadequate oversight was especially dangerous in combination with nonstandard Engineering practices". D. Systems Engineering, System Safety and R&QA Program Integration, Operational Safety and Performance, Risk Management, and Facility Safety Inspections-LLIS 0495
Background: On December 9, 1982, the 80 x 120 foot wind tunnel at the Ames Research Center was undergoing commissioning/shakedown testing when Vane Set 5 collapsed destroying the vane set, the fan blades of all six drive motors, and damaging the tunnel itself.
The systems lesson learned was that "Procedures for effective Systems Engineering on safety issues were lacking. Recommendation was made to "Define procedures to ensure effective Systems Engineering" and "Institute cost control System for safety and reliability". Either the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) process must include the natural environments effects on the system, or the limitations of the PRA process must otherwise be compensated for assessment. A proactive and ongoing risk review process that includes the environmental aspects and recommends actions to the program manager is necessary to control and accept safety risks.
E. SWIFT Power Control Board Harness Wire Reversal-LLIS 1398
Background: During instrument integration, a GSE power harness seriously damaged SWIFT heater control electronics. This mishap occurred on the Burst Alert Telescope (BAT) Power Control Board (PCS). Serious damage to the instrument's heater control electronics resulted from incorrect wiring within the interface harness. Efforts to expedite the I&T schedule, incomplete documentation and reduced QA involvement were identified as contributing factors; however, risks were expected to be mitigated by the Safe-to-Mate procedure, which was expected to verify compliance with the ICD. These "time saving" decision and acceptance of Lesson: One of the key "lessons learned" was "Project Systems Engineering and quality assurance must be responsible f or ensuring the correctness of power interface harness prior to the application of flight hardware power. A system of checks and balances, which verifies flight hardware integration readiness, should be supported by both reviews and audits of power interface harnesses.
F. Systems Engineering Management Plan-OSP 12.0001
Background: The Program and Project System Engineering Management Plan was baselined late into the Program development (i.e. just prior to the Systems Design Review). As such there was unclear direction of how to handle milestone event success criteria. The confused the contractors about some of the System Engineering processes that NASA wanted. As a result, they did not include all of their trade studies in the Trade Studies Report. Furthermore, funding was used redoing documents.
Lesson:
The System Engineering Plan (per NASA Systems Engineering Handbook) should be baselined in the Mission Definition Phase of a Program.
G. Systems Engineering Management Plan-OSP 12.0002
Background: The unusual OSP organizational structure with system engineering functions scattered all over the program office caused confusion in the requirements area, the contractor systems engineering and integration area, the risk management area and the trade studies area. rd AIAA Aerospace Sciences Meeting, January 8-13, 2005
The fact that the roles and interface responsibilities for the various systems engineering related offices were not precisely described in the Systems Engineering Management Plan (SEMP) made the confusion worse, with some jobs being duplicated and other being missed completely.
Lesson: All Systems Engineering functions need to be located in a centralized Systems Engineering organization. The SEMP, agreed to and followed by all involved in the program, should define the roles and interface responsibilities of all groups performing Systems Engineering functions. The SEMP should also contain a lit of all products the Systems Engineering organization is responsible for, as well as a list of required data, the organization responsible for providing the data and the users of the product.
ADDITIONAL SYSTEMS ENGINEERING LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARIZED
As part of the NASA Exploration Systems Mission initiative, an effort was undertaken to identify lessons learned that might be applicable to the Mission. One of these efforts involved a workshop held at the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center. Some of the Systems Engineering lessons learned were identified with respect to mission and systems requirement definition. They are summarized below in no particular order of priority.
A. LESSON:
The establishment of standards in the areas of environment, data/communications, and management of vehicle data would help to avoid problems of previous human exploration programs. This is a Systems Engineering and Integration task that promotes enhanced integration, enhanced communications, and requirement consistency. To minimize integration difficulties, it is important to establish one set of standards for the program. System Engineering standards are not currently agency-wide and should be.
B. LESSON:
A strong Systems Engineering function at the program level is vital, and therefore the Exploration Systems Office should identify a Systems Engineering and Integration (SE&I) process, train the personnel on it, and implement the SE&I process for the life of the program. Key participants also need to be established and involved. The Systems Engineering processes affect people and the system; make the processes doctrine for all, and prescribe that they be followed.
C. LESSON:
It is important to have System Engineering follow the established NASA Systems Engineering guideline and to maintain a strong capability and presence in the program. For example, it is imperative that a Program-level Systems Engineering Management Plan (SEMP) be established and distributed to all lower level projects. D. LESSON: Emphasizing Human Factors Engineering (HFE) during a program's concept definition and including HFE professionals in the development and consolidation of the basic requirements will help reduce design process costs. The HFE requirements associated with task accomplishment for Intravehicular Activity, Extravehicular Activity, and robotic tasks are all affected by the same or extremely similar constraints. Historically, HFE professionals have not been consulted in the development of requirements for Extravehicular Activity and robotic design and this resulted in cost overruns to the program. HFE need to be treated as a sub-discipline within Systems Engineering and Integration and need to be included in the development of the Work Break Structure for the program. By inclusion of HFE in requirement development from the beginning of the program effort, crew safety, efficiency, and performance as well as supporting crew habitability will be enhanced. E. LESSON: Integrated Product Teams (PTs) and Analytical Integration Teams (AITs) are necessary to achieve the program Systems Engineering and Integration required. These IPTs and AITs should be built in to a program's structure and methodology. All program organizations must be represented in an IPT/AIT to ensure that a full set of requirements is captured and developed. rd AIAA Aerospace Sciences Meeting, January 8-13, 2005
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In modern government and aerospace industry institutions the necessity of controlling currentyear costs often leads to high mobility in the technical workforce, "one-deep" technical capabilities, and minimal mentoring for young engineers. Thus, formal recording and teaching of systems engineering lessons learned is especially important in the maintenance and improvement of current knowledge and development of new technologies.
Within the NASA Technical Standards Program Website http://standards.nasa.gov there is a menu item entitled "Lessons Learned/Best Practices" (Figure 1 ). It contains links to a large number of engineering and technical disciplines related data sets that contain a wealth of lessons learned information based on past experiences. This paper has provided a small sample of lessons learned relative to the Systems Engineering. There are many more whose subsequent applications have improved our knowledge of Systems Engineering and the application of this knowledge to a variety of aerospace engineering programs.
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